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CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW IN
AIRCRAFT NOISE POLLUTION CONTROL
MAnUN K. NORTH
INTRODUCTION

Noise, defined as "unwanted sound,"' has become a global problem.' It is said that the United States is the noisiest country on the
planet, with noise pollution reaching crisis proportions.3 There are
countless sources of noise; construction equipment, industrial
machinery, automobiles, and aircraft are some of the more glaring
examples. There are many adverse effects, both physiological and
behavioral, from noise; hearing loss or impairment, interference
with sleep, fatigue, pain in the auditory systems, loss of equilibrium, stress and debilitating effect on human organs, speech
interference, dream interruption, hindrance of concentrated mental
effort, interference with task performance, annoyance and irritability, interference with relaxation and recreation, and feelings of
loss of privacy."
Attention has been focused on aircraft noise abatement due to
the severity of the problem In the United States approximately six
million people live where the levels of aircraft noise create a significant annoyance." Further, approximately 600,000 of these citizens
live in areas severely impacted by aircraft noise.'
Other aspects of aircraft noise pollution which makes a solution
desirable are its monetary cost to airport proprietors and the safety
hazards caused by airport noise-abatement procedures. In the last
five years, noise-related litigation for nuisance and inverse condem'J.
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Id. at 4.
3Hatfield, Noise, the Gathering Crisis, 1 ENvr'L L. 33 (1970).
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nation have resulted in airport proprietors paying over $25,000,000
in legal judgments and settlements and over $3,000,000 in legal
fees, expert testimony, and other defense efforts.! Airport noise
controls, such as taking off and landing over water, have caused
the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association to rate
several U.S. airports as "critically deficient" in safety features.'
Although aircraft noise cannot be eliminated unless man returns to the glider," technology, which must bear great responsibility for noise pollution, can provide some answers." Quieter aircraft have been designed and there are "retrofit"'" packages available for reducing noise levels of older aircraft. Man must work in
conjunction with technology to find a solution to this global
problem.
TraditionalLegal Remedies
The traditional legal remedies for one adversely affected by aircraft noise have been nuisance actions and inverse condemnation
suits. Plaintiffs look to the courts to compensate them for the
damage caused by noise. It was hoped that the monetary costs to
the defendants would result in some elimination of noise.
The leading case of this type is United States v. Causby," in
which the United States Supreme Court held that continued lowaltitude flights by U.S. military aircraft, which made the plaintiff's
property unsuitable for a chicken farm, constituted a wrongful
taking of an air easement, entitling the plaintiff to compensation
under the fifth amendment. This decision, combining elements of
trespass and elements of nuisance, marked "the advent of the theory
of inverse condemnation.""' Although the court recognized that the
8Id. at 18.
9NEWSWEEK, April 11, 1977, at 53.
"0DOT NOISE POLICY, supra note 4, at 2.
"1 HILDEBRAND, supra note 1, at 4.
1"Retrofit involves a physical modification of present aircraft.

"a328 U.S. 256 (1946).
4Russell, Aircraft/Airport Noise: Current Legal Remedies and Future Alter-

natives, 42 INS. COUNS. J. 92 (1975). "Inverse condemnation is the popular
description of a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the
value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant
even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency." Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178,
376 P.2d 100, 101 n.1 (1962).
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air is a public highway and that Congress had placed navigable
airspace within the public domain,' the flights in question were

not found to be within the navigable airspace which Congress
placed within the public domain. The court found that a landowner has, as an incident to his ownership, a claim to the superadjacent airspace, and further that invasions of this airspace were
"in the same category as invasions of the surface."'" The finding
of an actual invasion of the plaintiff's property, an element of

trespass, distinguished the case from a legalized nuisance case.'
The later case of Griggs v. Allegheny County" was also based
upon a theory of inverse condemnation. There, the plaintiff and
his family were forced to move by the noise, vibration and danger

from regular and frequent low altitude flights over their home.
The noise on takeoff was comparable "to the noise of a rivetting

machine or steam hammer" and on let down "to that of a noisy
factory."1 The United States Supreme Court held the local governmental airport authority liable for a taking of an air easement, so
that compensation was required by the fourteenth amendment.
The court reasoned that it was the local authority that decides
whether to build an airport and where to locate it" and concluded
that in designing the airport it did not acquire enough private prop-

erty by constitutional standards," i.e., to satisfy the fourteenth
amendment's requirement of just compensation.
13 Under those statutes [Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, 49
U.S.C. S 171, as amended by Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. § 401] the United States has 'complete, and
exclusive national sovereignty in the air space' over this country.
49 U.S.C. 5 176(a). They grant any citizen of the United States
'a public right of freedom of transit in air commerce through the
navigable air space of the United States.' 49 U.S.C. § 403. And
'navigable air space' is defined as 'airspace above the minimum
safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.' 49 U.S.C. § 180.
328 U.S. 256, 260 (1945).
16Id. at 265.
17 Id. at 262. The court distinguished the case from Richards v. Washington,
233 U.S. 546 (1913) in which property owners whose land was adjacent to a
railroad line were unable to recover for damages resulting from the noise, vibration and smoke caused by the train.
18369 U.S. 84 (1962).
9Id. at 87.
"Id. at 84-85.
1Id. at 84.
12Id. at 90.
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The federal courts have followed Causby in requiring a physical
invasion of the airspace over the plaintiff's property as a prerequisite to recovery. Batten v. United States represents the position that a physical trespass on or above the plaintiff's land is a
requirement of a "taking." In Batten, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that although the vibrations, smoke, and noise produced by military jet aircraft interfered with the use and enjoyment
of the plaintiff's property, such interference was' not a taking" because there was no physical invasion. The court said, "We are cited
to no decisions holding that the U.S. is liable for noise, vibration,
or smoke without a physical invasion. In Causby, Griggs, and a
number of lower court decisions ... there were regular flights over
the property. Absent such a physical invasion recovery has been
uniformly denied."'
The court in Batten recognized that some state constitutions
avoid this result by providing the "private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without compensation,"" while
the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution simply provides "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."" Therefore, in the courts of states so providing, compensation can be awarded for damage caused by noise and vibration
without a direct physical overflight. Federal courts and the courts
of states whose constitution makes no provision for "damaging"
of property require a physical overflight for compensation.
Also responsible for the difference between the federal courts
and some state courts is the adoption by some state courts of the
dissent in Batten, that "a constitutional taking does not necessarily
depend on whether the Government physically invaded the property damaged. 2' . For these courts the constitutional test in each
case is:
whether the asserted interest is one in which the law will protect;
2306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
24
1d. at 585.
2lJd.
at 584.
"Id. at 583-84 (emphasis added). 2A. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN

S

6.44,

at 151-52 (3d ed. 1976) lists those states whose constitutions provide that private
property should neither be taken nor damaged for public use without just compensation.
21U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
28

306 F.2d at 586.
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if so, whether the interference is sufficiently direct, sufficiently
peculiar, and of sufficient magnitude to cause us to conclude that
fairness and justice, as between the State and the Citizen, requires
the burden imposed to be borne by the public and not by the
individual alone."
Thornburg v. Port of Portland" and Martin v. Port of Seattle"
are the leading cases representing this line of thought.
In Thornburg, the Supreme Court of Oregon said that it found
the dissent in Batten to represent the better-reasoned analysis of
the legal principles involved." The plaintiffs contended that systematic flights passing close to, but not directly over, their land
constituted a taking of an easement." The Oregon Constitution only
allowed compensation for "taking," not for "damaging."" The
court was squarely presented with the question of whether a noisenuisance can amount to a taking." The court said "there is a question, in each case, as a matter of fact, whether or not the governmental activity complained of has resulted in so substantial an
interference with the use and enjoyment of one's land as to amount
to a taking of private property for public use."38 The court felt this
question was "equally relevant whether the taking is trespassory
or by a nuisance,"" i.e., whether the flights passed over the land
or not. The reasoning of the court was that a "nuisance can be
such an invasion of the rights of a possessor as to amount to a
taking, in theory at least, any time a possessor is in fact ousted
from the enjoyment of his land." 8 It held that a taking occurs
whenever the government acts in such a way as to substantially
deprive an owner of the useful possession of that which he owns,
whether by repeated trespass or by repeated non-trespassory invasions called "nuisance.""
1IId. at 587.
11233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
"164 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
32376 P.2d at 104.
" Id.at 102.
"'Id.at 103; see Stoebuck, Condemnation By Nuisance: The Airport Cases
in Retrospect and Prospect, 71 DIcK. L. REv. 207, 225 (1967).
376 P.2d at 101.
soId. at 105.
"37Id.

ssId.
89Id. at 106.
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In Martin v. Port of Seattle, the trial court held that with respect
to those property owners whose land was subjected to direct overflights by aircraft, the overflights amounted to a taking of an air
easement and for the property owners whose land was near but
not directly under the flights, the flights acounted to a damaging
of their property."0 The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed,
saying it was substantially in agreement with the trial court but
would not stress any of the proposed distinctions between "taking"
and "damaging" of a property right, as the Washington Constitution provided a basis for compensation in either instance."'
The court expressed its preference for the dissent in Batten,"
and said that it was "unable to accept the premise that recovery
for interference with the use of land should depend upon anything
as irrelevant as whether the wing tip of the aircraft passes through
some fraction of an inch of the airspace directly above the plaintiff's land."' In discussing Causby and Griggs, the court found that
"the reliance placed upon the high noise level by the Supreme
Court in both decisions, without detectable preoccupation with its
angle of incidence, strongly indicates that the holdings are not
limited to those instances where the aircraft passes directly over
the land.""
The question of what legal remedies are available in light of a
federal preemption in the field of aircraft noise regulation was presented in Luedtke v. County of Milwakee." The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that since federal laws and regulations have
preempted local control of aircraft flights the defendants could
not be charged with negligence, the creation of a nuisance, or violation of a state law making it lawful for an aircraft to fly at such
low altitudes as to interfere with the then-existing use of the land
and water below, as long as the flights were in accordance with
federal laws and regulations."" If the flights had in fact resulted in
a "taking" of the plaintiff's property, they could seek compensa40391
41

P.2d 540, 543 (Wash. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).

Id.

4ld.
4Id.

at 546.
at 545.

" Id.

-521

F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975).

46Id. at 391.
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tion in an inverse condemnation action.'
Inverse condemnation suits by private citizens, although they
may result in compensation for the damage caused by noise, are
not real solutions-they do not solve the problem by abating or
eliminating noise in any way, and have not served as an effective
anti-noise device. Consequently, other alternatives have been
turned to; among them are political solutions.
PoliticalSolutions
Various political solutions were examined by Joseph Vittek, Jr.,
in a 1972 article on airport noise control. ' These solutions include
alternatives to air service such as improved railways or highways,
relocation of airports in less populated areas, renovation of present
airports, zoning the land around airports so that land use is compatible with noise and imposition of airport taxes based on noise
levels. A limitation and curfew on the type of aircraft that can
use a facility, the number of operations permitted, and the time of
those operations was another political solution considered.'
None of these solutions is ideal for various reasons. Rail and
highway transportation are not free from noise, are expensive to
construct, and cannot match the speed of air service. Most airport relocation efforts have been blocked by residents in the selected area, and, even if a new airport is built, the older airport
may not be permanently closed. Additional land is not always
available for renovation of present airports, and increased neighborhood objection is inevitable since there will probably not be
enough land for sufficient noise dissipation and since more aircraft
will use the expanded facilities. Zoning of the land around airports
is an ineffective solution because existing uses of property surrounding older airports often cannot be zoned out of existence.
As for taxation, most airports are operated by government units
'IId.;

see San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Court of San Diego, 67

Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1977), which followed Luedike and said

"nothing in the Burbank decision suggests an airport operator is relieved by federal law of the common law duty to act nortoriously as a proprietor. If the Port
District has tortiously managed and maintained the facilities at Lindbergh Field
to the harm of some or all of the plaintiffs, the action is not precluded by the
doctrine of federal preemption." 136 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
" 4 Vittek, Airport Noise Conrtol-Can Communities Live Without It? Can
Airlines Live With It?, 38 J. Am L. & CoM. 473, 492 (1972).
4

9 ld.

at 484-89.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
and are tax-exempt, and many airports are located in different
political subdivisions from the people most affected by the noise."
Curfews, such as airport night curfews during the hours people
sleep, deserve special mention since they are increasing nationally
and internationally 1 and seem a partial solution. Unrestricted curfews, however, could adversely affect scheduled airline service,
congestion during non-curfew hours, air cargo, U.S. mail, banks,
employment and industry." Further, as a result of federal preemption of the field, curfews may only be imposed by a state or
locality operating as an airport proprietor."3
Local Regulation and Federal Preemption
Local regulation represents another method of aircraft noise
control. Local governments have attempted to abate aircraft noise
through regulation based on their police powers. In regulating
noise, however, they face a potential conflict between state and
federal spheres of control, and a possible Supremacy Clause problem. "[F]ederal control is exclusive when a conflict does arise and
the area would be pre-empted by the national government under
the supremacy clause.""4
The first major cases dealing with federal preemption in this
area were Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst" and
American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead," both involving
Kennedy Airport in New York. Cedarhurstwas a 1956 case involving a suit to enjoin enforcement of a village ordinance prohibiting
air flights at less than 1000 feet when passing over the village of
Cedarhurst." The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
federal regulatory system had preempted the airspace field below
50 Id.

11Koziharow, Airport Curfews Jeopardize Commerce, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Feb. 23, 1976, at 27.
51Id. at 28.
"5 See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 635

n.14 (1973).
5 Vittek, supra note 48, at 494.
-238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
5 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aft'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
51238 F.2d at 812.
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as well as above 1000 feet from the ground, so the ordinance was
invalid.'
Next, the Town of Hempstead attempted to regulate noise levels
rather than air traffic, hoping in this way to avoid the federal preemption found in Cedarhurst. The district court, however, found
the ordinance invalid as conflicting with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) landing and takeoff regulations for Kennedy Airport, holding that "the legislation operates in an area committed
to federal care, and noise limiting rules operating as do those of
the ordinance must come from a federal source.'" The court had
found it the "legal equivalent of the invalid Cedarhurst Ordinance"6 for "the aircraft and its noise are indivisible; . . .[t]o exclude the aircraft noise from the Town is to exclude the aircraft ....
[T]he ordinance does not forbid noise except by forbidding
flights."' 1
The City of Burbank attempted to distinguish its ordinance
from those of Cedarhurst and Hempstead and thus hopefully avoid
the fate that met those ordinances. Instead of regulating the flights
of aircraft themselves, Burbank attempted regulation of flights by
limiting the number of hours of airport land use. A city ordinance
placed an 11 P.M. to 7 A.M. curfew on jet flights from the Hollywood-Burbank airport. The United States Supreme Court in City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc." considered this ordinance and held it unconstitutional on the grounds of the Supremacy
Clause."3
51Id. at 813, 815; see City of Newark v.Eastern Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 750
(D.N.J. 1958).
59272 F. Supp. at 231.

:0id. at 230.
61

Jd.

U.S. 624.
Id. at 626. In determining whether Congress had intended to preempt the
field, the court looked to the tests set forth in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corps.,
62 411
03

331 U.S. 218 (1947).

The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it. . . . Or the Act of Congress may touch a field
in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system

will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject.... [Or] the object sought to be obtained by the federal law
and the character of the obligations imposed by it may reveal the
same purpose . . . Or the state policy may produce a result incon-
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Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas found a federal preemption of "airspace management," through section 1508 of the
Federal Aviation Act!' which provides that the "United States of
America is declared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive
national sovereignty in the airspace of the United States." He
further found that the Noise Control Act of 1972, ' which had
been passed subsequent to the District Court and Court of Appeals
judgments, although having no express provision for preemption,
reaffirms and reinforces the conclusion that FAA, now in conjunction with the EPA, has full control over aircraft noise, preempting state and local control ....
It is the pervasive nature of
the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to
conclude that there is pre-emption."
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in the five to four decision, wrote
that:
because noise regulation has traditionally been an area of local,
not national, concern, in determining whether congressional legislation has, by implication, foreclosed remedial local enactment
we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'
In regard to the Federal Aviation Act,'" therefore, Rehnquist found
that the "Congress was not concerned with the problem of noise
created by aircraft and did not intend to pre-empt its regulation. "6
As to section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act," added by the 1968
amendments, he again found no preemptive intent. 1 Finally, with
respect to the 1972 Noise Control Act, 2 he found that it "quite
sistent with the objective of the federal statute.
331 U.S. at 230.
64 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §5
1301 et seq. (1970 and Supp. V.), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch.
601, 52 Stat. 973.
e542 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1970).
61411 U.S. at 633.
67 Id. at 643
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
6849 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970).
"411

U.S. at 644.
§ 1431 (1970).

7049 U.S.C.

"'411 U.S. at 645-52.
7242 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1970).
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clearly intended to maintain the status quo beween federal and
local authorities."'
The finding of federal preemption of airport noise control in
Burbank led to a forecasting that the federal government would
assume liability for noise along with its preemption of control.
This was, however, not to be the case. This issue of who should
bear the liability arose in the 1973 case of Aaron v. City of Los
Angeles,' an inverse condemnation action against the City as
proprietor of the Los Angeles International Airport.' The plaintiffs sought to recover for diminution of the value of their property
due to jet noise. The City contended in defense that since there was
federal preemption of navigable airspace, the City was immune
from liability.' 6 The California Court of Appeals answered that
"the fact the flights are within the navigable airspace does not immunize the owner and operator of an airport for failure to appropriate the land and airspace necessary to provide an adequate
approach way,"" citing among other cases, Griggs, Martin, and
Thornburg."The City also contended that since there was federal
preemption of aircraft noise control, the government must bear
liability for the damages." The court, however, held that the contention that federal preemption precluded all state activity in aircraft noise control had been rejected in a previous case, Loma
Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc." The City was not
11411 U.S. at 652.
7440 Cal. App. 3d 471,
115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
"That the airlines should bear liability for a "taking" of property was expressly rejected in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), where the
court said:
It is argued that though there was a 'taking,' someone other than
[Allegheny County] was the taker-the airlines or the C.A.A.
acting as an authorized representative of the United States. We
think, however, that [the County], which was the promoter, owner,
and lessor of the airport, was in these circumstances the one who
took the air easement in the constitutional sense.
369 U.S. at 89. See Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.
1975).
" 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).
'7 115 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
76Id.; see text accompanying notes 16-18, 28-42 supra.
79

115 Cal. Rptr. at 173.

Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rtpr. 708 (1964). Owners of property
near a public airport brought suit to enjoin commercial airlines from performing
6061
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"powerless to take steps to alleviate the problem of jet noise,"'"
since as an airport proprietor it could make rules regulating the
use of the airport." The court pointed out that in both the Burbank
and Hempstead cases,' where the noise regulations were held invalid, the municipality was not the owner and operator of the airport," and that in footnote fourteen of the Burbank decision, the
Supreme Court had "expressly avoided decision as to the powers
of a municipality as proprietor of the airport. '' "
In Air Transport Association of America v. Crotti" the Burbank
footnote was also discussed where the District Court of Northern
California said "that correlating right of proprietorship control is
recognized and exempted from judicially declared federal preemption by footnote 14."' It accepted the footnote as making a
distinction between a municipality's exercise of police power (the
situation in Burbank) and a municipality's exercise of its power as
an owner-operator of an airport." In Crotti, the Air Transport
Association sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground
that California airport and aircraft noise standards were invalid
under the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause as implemented by controlling federal legislation and regulations." The
court found some of the state noise regulations"' a per se unlawful
certain flight operations. The defendants argued that refusal to grant the injunction
could be supported on the ground of federal preemption, i.e., that state action
affecting any aspect of flight operations is precluded by the extensive pattern of
federal regulation in the field. The court disagreed and said:
[A]s was said in Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 ...

In the absence of a clear holding by the Supreme Court of the
United States that Federal jurisdiction has been made exclusive,
we shall not make what would be tantamount to an abdication of

the hitherto undoubted jurisdiction of our own courts.
394 P.2d at 554.
" 115 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
2 d.; see Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 259 F. Supp.
745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) and Stagg v. Municipal Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82 Cal.

Rptr. 578 (1969).
See text accompanying notes 56, 59-73 supra.

'4115 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
851d.

11389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
87 id. at 64.
8"Id. at 63.

"389

F. Supp. at 58.

"SENEL (Single Event Noise Exposure Levels) prohibitions applied to the
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exercise of police power in the federally preempted area of aircraft in flight.91 Other state noise regulations were held not per se

invalid as an invasion of a federally preempted area, 3 but were
apparently a lawful exercise of local government proprietary

powers. Crotti thus illustrates that local regulation by a municipality acting as an airport proprietor in the field of noise control
does not necessarily invade a federally preempted area. Later cases

have also recognized this and upheld local regulation by a municipality acting as an airport proprietor.'
Local Regulation and the Commerce Clause

In addition to being declared invalid due to federal preemption,
local regulations can be declared void because they unduly burden
interstate commerce and are thus unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause."3 It would not make any difference in such cases
whether the local government was acting in its proprietary capacity
inseparable feature of noise generated by an aircraft directly engaged in flights."
389 F. Supp. at 62.
1
I at 65.
1d.
'2 "CNEL (Community Noise Equivalent Level) standards prescribed for continued operation of airports with monitoring requirements, which focus upon the
arrival of a prescribed ultimate maximum noise level and limiting the land uses
subjected thereto around airport facilities." 389 F. Supp. at 62.
'1 389 F. Supp. at 65. The court did not reach the question of whether the
CNEL regulations were "in fact unrealistic, arbitrary and unreasonable, and an
abuse of polce powers constituting an unlawful burden or infringement upon any
United States constitutional right of privilege held by a proprieter of an airport,
or an unreasonable burden upon interstate and foreign commerce as utilized by
aircraft." Id.
"4 See National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal.
1976), where the court held the city acting as airport proprietor was not precluded on the ground of federal preemption from regulation by a city ordinance
which prohibited all aircraft exceeding a certain noise level from landing or taking off between the hours of 11:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M., although it was clear
that this ordinance would constitute an impermissible exercise of police power
in an area preempted by Congress if passed by a state or local government not
the proprietor of the airport. 418 F. Supp. at 420-25; and British Airways Board
v. Port Authority of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977), where the court recognized the power of an airport proprietor to impose use restrictions based on noise
considerations, but found it vested only with the power to promulgate reasonable
non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory regulations that establish acceptable noise
levels for the airport and its immediate environs.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 3; see Goldstein, Aviation Noise Abatement:
Is There Room for Local Regulation?, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 286 (1975);
Stein, The Effect of the Federal Pre-emption of Noise Control and Air Pollution
on Local Initiative: Can Prometheus be Unbound?, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 427,
432-33 (1972).
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or not. As one commentator has noted, "In the absence of congressional action, the commerce clause seems to protect the free
flow of interstate commerce from the hostile actions of state or
local governments even when they take such actions in their proprietary capacity.""
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Hempstead," the court found a
Commerce Clause violation. "Legislation . . . that denies access

to navigable air space by local rule cannot be regarded as a plain
and forbidden exertion of the power to regulate commerce as
such."' .. The Court mentioned the problem that could be created
if neighboring towns imposed different and inconsistent rules."
The District Court in the Burbank case1" based its decision on
both the Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause in finding the
ordinance unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court affirmed on Supremacy Clause grounds alone,"' but the
Supreme Court implied that the Commerce Clause could also have
been the basis of the decision, noting that "If we were to uphold
the Burbank ordinance and a significant number of municipalities
followed suit, it is obvious that fractionalized control of the timing
of take-offs and landings would10 severely limit the flexibility of FAA
in controlling air traffic flow."
In National Aviation v. City of Hayward" commercial airplane

operators sought a declaration of unconstitutionality of a city
ordinance which prohibited all aircraft exceeding a certain noise
level from landing or taking off from the Hayward Air Terminal.
Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance burdened interstate commerce
by forcing them to make their flights from another airport and
thereby impairing their ability to deliver the mail and newspapers
"Goldstein,

supra note 95, at 292-93. See Kansas City S. Ry. v. Kaw Valley

Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75 (1914) which held that "freedom from interference

on the part of the State is not confined to a simple prohibition of laws impairing
[interstate commerce], but it extends to interference by any ultimate organ."
233 U.S. at 78.
'r

See text accompanying notes 56, 59-61 supra.

"272 F. Supp. at 232.
"Id.; see Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
' oSee text accompanying notes 62-73 supra.

"1'411 U.S. at 626.
02Id. at 639.
'"418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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to their customers.' The court found any burden on interstate
commerce was incidental and not excessive when weighed against
the legitimate goal of controlling noise levels at the airport during
late evening and morning hours.". ' It recognized the possibility that
other municipalities might enact similar ordinances which would
together then create an impermissible burden, but found that possibility was mere speculation at this time."
The Federal Aviation Act and The Noise Control Act of 1972
In addition to traditional legal remedies, political solutions, and
local regulation, federal regulation has been considered a remedy
to aircraft noise pollution. Prior to 1968, the FAA prescribed noise
abatement regulations under the authority of section 307 (e) of the
Federal Aviation Act.' In 1968, Congress adopted section 611 of
the Federal Aviation Act'- which authorized the Administrator
of the FAA to prescribe regulations for control and abatement of
aircraft noise and sonic boom. That section, as amended, requires
the FAA to publish Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
proposed regulations as a notice of proposed rulemaking. "[I]f the
FAA does not adopt an EPA proposal as a final rule after notice
and comment, it is obliged 'to publish an explanation for not doing
so in the Federal Register. "
On November 18, 1969, the FAA promulgated the first aircraft
noise regulations in Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 36."1 These
regulations set a limit on noise emissions of large aircraft of new
design."' In 1973, the Part 36 standard was extended to cover all
newly manufactured aircraft of already certificated types." '
The Noise Control Act of 1972"' supplemented the FAA's rulemaking authority. The Noise Control Act represents the federal
government's first comprehensive venture into the field of noise
'04 1d. at 427.
'10Id.
101id. at 428.
10749 U.S.C. S 1348(c) (1970).
10849 U.S.C. 5 1431 (1970).
1-'49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970); DOT NOISE POLICY, supra note 4, at 30.
1014 C.F.R. Part 36 (1977).
"'DOT
11

Noise Policy, supra note 4, at 30.

Id.

"'42 U.S.C. S§ 4901-4918 (1970).
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pollution control,11 ' dealing with several sources of noise, including
aircraft noise. Its purpose was to "establish a means for effective
coordination of Federal research and activities in noise control,
to authorize the establishment of Federal noise emission standards
for products distributed in commerce, and to provide information
to the public respecting the noise emission and noise reduction
characteristics of such products. 1 . The Noise Control Act begins
with the findings of Congress "that inadequately controlled noise
presents a growing danger to the health and welfare of the Nation's population. . ."" and "that, while primary responsibility for
control of noise rests with state and local governments, federal action is essential to deal with major noise sources in commerce,
control of which require national uniformity of treatment. 17
The Noise Control Act established a complicated arrangement
between the EPA and the FAA.1 '8 Under the Act, the Administrator of the EPA was directed to conduct a nine month study of the
(1) adequacy of FAA flight and operational noise controls;
(2) adequacy of noise emission standards on new and existing
aircraft;
(3) implications of identifying and achieving levels of cumulative noise exposure around airports; and
(4) additional measures available to airport operators and local
governments to control aircraft noise.""
The EPA Administrator also makes recommendations for aircraft
noise standards,1 ' although under section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act, the final decision as to the regulations is left to the FAA
without the necessity of the EPA's consent. 1 '
Although the FAA acted promptly in promulgating regulations
for aircraft of new design in 1969 and newly manufactured aircraft
of already certificated types in 1973, it has been accused of regula114Note, The Noise Control of 1972-Congress Acts to Fill the Gap in Environmental Legislation, 58 MINN. L. REV. 273, 284 (1973).
"5642 U.S.C. § 4901 (1970).
"a6
Id.
117

Id.

Russell, supra note 14, at 97.
11042 U.S.C.
4906 (1977).
10542 U.S.C. § 4906 (1977); see Note, Environmental Law: The Noise Control
Act of 1972, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 55, 57 (1974).
12149 U.S.C. § 1431 (1976).
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tory paralysis in regard to aircraft already manufactured and
operating.' Unfortunately, these older aircraft contribute the most
to the noise pollution problem, with over seventy-seven per cent
of the operating fleet not meeting federal noise standards. ' The
FAA finally took action regarding these aircraft with the adoption
of the Aviation Noise Abatement Policy in November, 1976.2"
The Aviation Noise Abatement Policy
The FAA had been under pressure to act from several directions.
In Congress, Representative Norman Mineta of California, introduced the Aircraft Noise Reduction and Airport Protection Acte'
in the House of Representatives on May 13, 1976, simultaneously
accusing the FAA of a "prolonged labor"" and pointing out that
although retrofit had been within the authority of the FAA since
1968, a retrofit rule has never been promulgated."" The proposed
Act directed the FAA to promulgate regulations prescribing noise
standards for operation of civil subsonic aircraft and prohibited
the operation of aircraft that do not meet such requirements at
the end of a five year period." 8 The proposed Act also authorized
grants to individuals to retrofit or replace noncomplying aircraft
with appropriations out of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.' 9
Mineta said "The real impact of this bill is to get the FAA and
the Transportation Department to move. '"3'
Pressure was also being brought by the states. A suit was filed by
Illinois, Massachusetts and New York in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia asking for a "mandatory injunction
directing FAA Administrator John L. McLucas either to adopt
recommended noise abatement regulations or publish a detailed
122 DOT, NOISE POLICY, supra note 4, at 30.
123DOT NEWS, Remarks Preparedfor Delivery by Sec. of Trans. W. T. Coleman, at a News Conference on Aviation Noise and Aircraft Replacement Policy,
Washington, D.C., Nov. 18, 1976, at 3.
4
" DOT NOISE POLICY, supra note 4.
22

H.R. 13783, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).

126CONG. REC.
127

Id.

E2578 (daily ed. May 13, 1976).

118H.R. 13783, Digest of Public General Bills, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2
(1976).

Id.
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explanation for failing to prescribe such regulations....' A notification document sent earlier by Illinois said:
while there may previously have been arguable excuses for the
Administration's failure to adopt regulations governing aircraft
noise, the technology which has readily been available for a number of years now, the failure to at least publicly comment upon,
if not adopt, regulations proposed and submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the Noise Control Act is
inexcusable."'
In the fall of 1976, action, was finally taken by the FAA. On
October 21, 1976, President Ford advised the FAA and the Department of Transportation (DOT) that he had accepted their
recommendation that action should be taken to extend current
noise standards to domestic U.S. commercial airplanes in not more
than eight years. He thereupon directed the FAA to promulgate
noise compliance regulations not later than January 1, 1977."'
In addition, the President put Congress on notice that he "will
not accept its failure to act" on aviation regulatory reform.'" Ford
placed part of the blame on Congress, charging that "one reason
U.S. commercial airlines have been unable to meet FAA noise
standards is that some airlines could not afford to because of the
outmoded regulatory approach of the CAB."''
At a news conference on November 18, 1976, Secretary of
Transportation, William T. Coleman, J., announced the Aviation Noise Abatement Policy of the DOT and FAA, saying that
"Aircraft noise is the number one aviation environmental problem
facing this Department,. ' . and that although "some might argue
that Federal action has been delayed too long, we hope the future
. . . will show that this delay . . . has enabled us to develop a
policy that will work and that will have a more lasting value over
the longer term. 13.
a1 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov.
"s

1, 1976, at 29.
Kozicharow, Illinois to Sue Over Noise Rules, Av.

WEEK & SPACE TECH.,

Aug. 2, 1976 at 28.
"'DOT Noise Policy, supra note 4, at 1.
I41d.

"' Aviation Daily, Oct. 22, 1976, at 282.
3 DOT NEWS, Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Sec. of Trans. W. T. Coleman, Jr., at a News Conference on Aviation Noise and Aircraft Replacement
Policy,
Washington, D.C., Nov. 18, 1976, at 1.
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The Aviation Noise Abatement Policy announced by Coleman
contains a Federal Action Plan, an Air Carrier Action Plan and a
plan for Local Actions. Part of the Federal Action Plan deals with
aircraft source noise regulation. For currently operating aircraft
it establishes a schedule under which all jet aircraft in domestic
service must comply, with Part 36 noise levels within six to eight
years, starting January 1, 1977. Aircraft not meeting the levels
must be retrofitted or retired from the fleet. " ' In regard to aircraft
of foreign countries, which were not to be covered by the regulations issued pursuant to the statement, the Policy announced that:
the United States will work through the International Civil Aviation Organization to reach agreement with other nations on means
to abate aircraft noise. If agreement is not reached in three years,
it is the intention of the federal government to require aircraft
flown by carriers of other countries to meet U.S. established noise
levels at the end of five additional years.'"
More stringent noise standards were scheduled to be completed by
the FAA by March 1, 1977, for future design aircraft, reflecting
recent advances in noise suppression technology." Finally, for
supersonic aircraft, the Policy announced that the FAA would
promulgate an, applicable noise regulation not later than thirty
days after the conclusion of the sixteen month demonstration
period, which ended November 24, 1977."
Operating procedures represent another part of the Federal Action Plan. The Policy announced that the FAA had taken regulatory action regarding operating procedures designed to abate noise,
including minimum altitude rules and approach procedures. Departure rules were to be developed within one year."
The Policy also announced as part of the Federal Action Plan
Acting under authority
an airport development aid program.'
granted in the 1976 amendments to the Airport and Airway Development Act,'" "the FAA will establish a high priority for the
'3'
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1401d.

Id. at 8.
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allocation of discretionary Airport and Airway Trust Funds for
airport land acquisition to ensure compatible use of land near airports, the purchase of noise suppressant equipment, the construction of physical barriers and other noise reduction activities.''.
Further, the DOT will encourage the development of new airports
and replacements for older airports in areas with large populations
adversely affected by noise, with federal financing to be conditioned on effective noise abatement planning. " " Beyond that, Congress will be requested to amend the Airport and Airway Development Act to include the acquisition, installation, and operation of
airport noise monitoring equipment among airport proprietor activities eligible for federal aid funding."'
Airport noise policy comprised the final part of the Policy's Federal Action Plan. It voiced the intentions of the FAA to assist
airport proprietors and sponsors in attaining noise abatement goals
and development of noise abatement plans, including use restrictions such as curfews. The FAA also indicated its willingness to
fund a selective number of model plans.'"'
The Policy's Air Carrier Action Plan stresses aircraft compliance
with Part 36 regulations and the financing necessary for compliance."" To comply with the federal rules air carriers must either
retrofit or retire many of their planes within eight years. Financing
will be necessary to meet this deadline.
Finally, the Policy discusses that Local Actions should be taken
to complement the Federal and Air Carrier Plans. Such local action should include land use planning and zoning and land development activities in areas surrounding airports in a manner
ensuring that land use is compatible with the noise exposure in
the area and construction standards and programs to ensure insulation from aircraft noise. Further provision should be made for
notice of aircraft noise exposure to purchasers of real estate near
airports."'
The division of the Aviation Noise Abatement Policy into a
14 DOT NOISE POLICY, supra note 4, at 8.
146 Id.
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Federal Action Plan, an Air Carrier Action Plan, and suggestions
for Local Actions is consistent with the stated principle that the
federal government, airport proprietors, state and local governments, air carriers, air travelers and shippers, and residents all
have authority and responsibilities for noise abatement, and must
plan and act in coordination.151 In discussing the legal responsibilities of different concerned groups, the Policy summarizes the legal
framework with respect to noise:
1. The federal government has preempted the areas of air space
use and management, air traffic control, safety and the regulation of aircraft noise at its source. The federal government also
has substantial power to influence airport development through
its administration of the Airport and Airway Development
Program.
2. Other powers and authorities to control airport noise rest with
the airport proprietor-including the power to select an airport
site, acquire land, assure compatible land use, and control airport design, scheduling and operations-subject only to Constitutional prohibitions against creation of an undue burden on
interstate and foreign commerce, unjust discrimination, and
interference with exclusive federal regulatory responsibilities
over safety and air space management.
3. State and local governments may protect their citizens through
land use controls and other policy power measure not affecting
aircraft operations. In addition, to the extent they are airport
proprietors, they have the powers described in paragraph 2. '
Criticism of the Aviation Noise Abatement Policy has focused
mainly on the financing aspect of aircraft replacement and modification, replacement being more desirable than retrofit and more
costily. The criticism is directed to the Policy's lack of a financing
program. It leaves unanswered the question of who will foot the
bill. The airline industry has just passed through a difficult financial
period, making the financing of new aircraft an even more critical
issue. The industry has been faced with substantial increases in
fuel prices, inflation in the cost of other materials, traffic levels
down due to the economic recession, and substantial excess capacity in equipment purchased in the 1960's for a predicted demand growth that did not occur." Now, as a result of the FAA's
IId. at 5, 6.
'5 id. at 34.

"I Id. at 24-25; Barron's, May 16, 1977, at 9.
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action, the airline industry is faced with the cost of meeting the
new noise requirements, estimated by the DOT at $5.8-7.9 bil1
lion. "
The fact that the Policy did not contain a financing program has
been criticized by both airlines and politicians. A TWA official
said, "The one thing we didn't want is for financing to be considered separately."'' It has been said that DOT Secretary Coleman
had been in favor of an accompanying financing program, but that
White House officials were leery of having the federal government
get involved in the financing and re-equipping of an industry and
thus setting a bad precedent for other industries facing costly environmental regulation.15
Hearings on the financing question were held on December 1,
1976, and several alternative means of financing were suggested.
The Air Transport Association proposed a two per cent ticket and
waybill surcharge to be deposited in an escrow account in which
the airlines would have drawing rights. The Aviation Consumer
Action Project (a Ralph Nader organization) was in favor of the
airlines' receiving subsidy payments from the Airport and Airway
Development Trust Fund. White, Weld & Co. recommended an
aircraft replacement cooperative owned by U.S. airlines with capital acquired from ticket surcharges, revenue bonds, voluntary subscriptions, loan guarantees fees, investment income and repayment
of prior investments. During the hearing, the banking and investment community expressed their reluctance to make any commitments so long as the airlines failed to attain a reasonable return
on investments." ' Aircraft manufacturers Boeing, McDonaldDouglas, and Lockheed were in favor of a plan to use a portion
of the user tax."
Other reactions to the financing problem include the National
Passenger Traffic Association's (NPTA) opposition to any program which would result in an increase in fare levels: "We do
oppose any financing scheme which will result in further punitive
154
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fare increases on our business travelers.".1 . The NPTA favors the
use of surpluses in the Airport and Airways Trust Fund for financing. NPTA President, C. Patrick Dovan, explained that "while
noise control is a desirable objective, the interest of the public in
low-cost air transportation is, in our view, superior to that objective." 1'" The Airport Operators Council International, on the other
hand, favored user taxes and felt that federal assistance "should
not, under any circumstances, deplete funding for airport/airway
development programs" which depend on the Airport and Airway
Trust Fund. '
As always, the problem seems to be dollars. The FAA has at
last moved towards reducing aircraft noise in almost eighty per
cent of the commercial airline fleet. It has taken eight years to
take this step knowing it would be an expensive one. But the FAA
has weighed the economic cost of retrofit and replacement against
the cost, economic, physical, and social, of aircraft noise and determine that the airlines, and, ultimately, the public, must bear the
estimated $5.8-7.9 billion cost of retrofit and replacement.
The suggested alternative methods of financing have been translated into proposed legislation." For financing of retrofit and replacement of noncomplying aircraft, the proposed bills look to use
of Airport and Airway Trust Fund revenues and a two percent surcharge on air fares and way bills. They also suggest amendment of
the Federal Aviation Act and the Airport and Airway Development Act. The DOT's own recommendation would be funding
provided by a two percent surcharge.'" Where Congress decides
the funds for compliance with the new noise requirements will
come from remains to be seen.
Criticism of the Aviation Noise Abatement Policy has also come
from Senate Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Howard Cannon.
Cannon has said:
1
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I am keenly disappointed by efforts of the lame-duck Administration to push through highly controversial and poorly thoughtout policies on aircraft noise. I would have hoped that after the
voters expressed their preference in the presidential election, the
members of Mr. Ford's team would have left to the incoming
Administration the difficult, controversial task of developing a
sensible aircraft noise policy.'"
Cannon further said that aircraft noise, while bothersome to perhaps a few million Americans at most, is not a pressing environmental problem.'63 Cannon wrote to Secretary Coleman asking
that he leave the final decision to the Carter Administration. "
Coleman's reply was that "I could not in good conscience leave
to the Carter Administration the complex question of basic aircraft
noise regulation after such extensive analysis, debate and effort
within the bureauracy, the industry, and on the Hill. Noise relief
is long overdue and I am sure the next President would not welcome further delay. 1.. President Carter, therefore, was left with
something in the nature of a fait accompli.
Conclusion
Noise relief has been long overdue. Although property owners
have the traditional legal remedy of inverse condemnation actions,
these are not real solutions to the noise problem. Political solutions
are not ideal for various reasons. Local regulations can be partially
effective, but they meet problems of federal preemption and the
Commerce Clause. Under the federal statutory scheme the federal
government has the authority and the responsibility to take steps
towards noise pollution control. Though the FAA has been slow
in taking some of these steps, the Aviation Noise Abatement Policy
announced in November, 1976 indicates its recognition of its responsibility and its willingness to work in coordination with all
groups concerned to effectively deal with the noise problem. All
that remains6 to be said is "After battle sleep is best, After noise,
tranquility.'"'
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